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A Perspective on the Houston Economy
alveston is located two
miles offshore on one of the
many barrier islands along the
Gulf of Mexico. Throughout its
history, the waters of Galveston
Bay attracted Indians, pirates
and explorers and served the
Gulf Coast as the best natural
harbor between New Orleans
and Vera Cruz.
After the Texas Revolution,
Michel B. Menard and a group
of investors gained title to 4,605
acres of land on Galveston
Island through a complicated
set of financial transactions.
They had a new town surveyed
and platted at this site, basing
the layout on New York and
Philadelphia street plans. The
Galveston City Co. began sell-
ing lots in 1838, and the Texas
Legislature incorporated the
city the following year.
When Houston and Galves-
ton were founded, the economic
roles played by the two cities
complemented each other.
With Texas rivers mostly un-
charted and none of them navi-
gable for any significant dis-
tance, Houston’s location was
strategically chosen at the most
interior point in the state that
could be served by water trans-
portation on a year-round
basis. Houston was a river port,
accepting agricultural produce
from the rich bottomlands
along the Brazos and Colorado
rivers and shipping it to Galves-
ton by barge or steamboat for
export from the state.
1 Of all
the exports leaving Texas
through Galveston before the
Civil War, 80 percent would
have arrived in Galveston via
Houston and the Buffalo
Bayou.
2 Warehousing and ship-
ping became Galveston’s main
commercial activity.
Initially, both cities earned 
a profitable living off of geog-
raphy by providing noncom-
petitive transportation services.
Over time, this cooperative
relationship eroded as shallow-
draft steamships, railroads and
port improvements shifted the
balance of power from one city
to the other. Both Houston and
Galveston aspired to greatness
from their inception—the use of
G
Houston in 1900
Part 3. The Galveston–Houston Rivalry
By 1900, Galveston
held a clear edge in
port facilities but
found itself at the
terminus of a 
poorly developed rail
network. Houston was
the regional rail 
hub but could not
demonstrate the logic
of a second port 
only 50 miles 
from Galveston.New York City as a model for
Galveston streets, for example,
was not without forethought. 
In many ways, the two new
cities were economic twins:
located 50 miles apart, settled
by Southerners, drawing on the
same agricultural wealth, built
on transportation services and
led mainly by members of the
commercial elite.
By the 1850s, the relation-
ship began to turn into a power-
ful economic rivalry, for only
one of the cities could possibly
achieve national or international
status. Historians disagree on
whether Houston won the battle
and Galveston lost or whether
geography and technical change
ultimately made a Houston vic-
tory inevitable. They do agree,
however, that Galveston never
recovered from the 1900 hurri-
cane, at least in terms of its
dream of becoming a major
metropolitan area (Figure 1).
The hurricane made the logic
of an inland port on the Texas
Gulf Coast clear to all.
This article tracks the Houston
–Galveston rivalry from its in-
ception in the 1850s to its end at
the start of the 20th century.
The story is of interest as an
economic history of Houston.
But it also illustrates how geog-
raphy can build economies and
how changing transportation
technology can enhance or
erode a city’s competitive posi-
tion over time. The leadership
of both cities sought to parlay
geographic advantage in this
civic rivalry.
Roots of the Rivalry
The first skirmish between
Houston and Galveston came
in the 1850s, and it was fought
over the orientation of Texas
railroads.
3 Both cities recog-
nized that the coming of the
rails would largely end river
transportation in the state—
that railroads would be the key
to moving product from the
state’s rich agricultural regions.
The battle would ultimately
turn on two questions: Should
the orientation of the rail system
be north–south or east–west?
And should ownership of the




the conventional program of
the times—sought an east–west
system developed by private
corporations with public subsi-
dies. This system would con-
verge on Houston, making the
city the center of the Texas rail
network. Corporate railroad
promoters demanded govern-
ment subsidies, mostly in the
form of land grants and loans,
arguing they were necessary to
promote railroads in a region
devoid of native capital and
lacking the population base
and industry needed to support
heavy rail traffic.
Galvestonians, in turn,
advocated a rail system fanning
out from their city and running
north to south. The initial
advocate of this plan was
Galveston News editor Willard


















The problem with the
Galveston plan was that it ran
against a strong national tide of
transcontinental construction,
and it was impossible to secure
private financing for such a
project. In the mid-1850s, the
Galveston plan evolved into a
proposal for state ownership of
the rail system. The Compromise
of 1850 had settled the dispute
between Texas and the United
States over the Texas–New
Mexico boundary, paid the state
debt and left $5 million in bonds
in state coffers. Just as corpo-
rate interests wanted a share of
these funds for rail subsidies,
so did Lorenzo Sherwood, a
Galvestonian who in the early
1850s devised a plan to use
these surpluses to finance a
1,000-mile, state-owned rail
network in Texas.
The plan was politically
attractive in populist Texas, but
both the plan and Sherwood’s
nonconformist ways ultimately
proved unpopular with Galves-
ton’s leadership. Sherwood was
driven from the Texas Legisla-
ture in 1856 for his abolitionist
views, and a month later the
legislature authorized a $6,000
loan, backed by the U.S. bonds,
for every mile of railroad track
laid in Texas. With this legis-
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau.lation, plus a state subsidy
authorized in 1854 of 16 sections
of land for each mile of track
laid, the transcontinental plan
cleared its final obstacle.
The decision was critical for
Houston because the railroads
provided a much-needed coun-
terweight to Galveston’s advan-
tages as a Gulf harbor. The first
Texas railroad was the Buffalo
Bayou, Brazos and Colorado,
which opened in 1853 and
reached Houston in 1856. By
the time the Civil War began,
Houston had captured the rail
network along the Texas Gulf;
of the 492 miles of track in
Texas, 350 led to Houston.
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Galveston was slower to
take an active interest in rail-
roads on the assumption that
Galveston was Houston’s port
and that what was good for
Houston was generally good
for Galveston. For example, the
Houston and Texas Central
Railway Co. added more than
any other line to Houston’s rail
presence, ultimately becoming
a major link in the Southern
Pacific’s transcontinental sys-
tem. However, the railroad 
had originally been chartered
in 1848 by a Galvestonian,
Ebenezer Allen, to run north and
east from Galveston through
cotton, sugar and timber coun-
try. The plan was opposed and
openly ridiculed in Galveston,
and Houston merchant Paul
Bremond eventually purchased
the charter.
A similar story can be told
for the Texas and New Orleans
Railroad, which ran east from
Houston to Beaumont and 
Port Arthur, with plans for 
connection to New Orleans.
The original 1856 charter was
for a railroad from Galveston 
to Beaumont, but by 1858 it
had transformed itself into a
Houston–New Orleans line.
The first railroad to reach
the island was the Galveston,
Houston and Henderson, char-
tered in 1853 with initial sup-
port from both Houston and
Galveston. Both cities bought a
token subscription of $300,000
in capital stock in 1855, but the
majority of the capital came
from European and Galveston
investors. Construction began
on the mainland opposite the
island and reached the outskirts
of Houston in 1859. Initially,
freight moving from Houston
to the island was transferred by
ferryboat, but in 1860 a 10,000-
foot trestle (the longest in the
hemisphere at that time) con-
nected the island and mainland.
The Houston depot for the
Galveston, Houston and Hen-
derson was to be located at the
corner of Main and McKinney.
But by the time the railroad
arrived, the city fathers had
rethought the value of a direct
rail connection to the sea. Fear-
ing that cotton would simply
flow straight through Houston
and on to Galveston without
stopping, the City Council
located the depot on the south
side of Main Street, denying the
railroad any link to the Texas
and Houston Central Railway.
During the Civil War the Galves-
ton–Houston connection was
imposed by military authorities,
and it became permanent in
1865. However, historian David
McComb cites this as the first
overt action in the coming eco-




Galveston Wharf and Cotton
Compress Co. was founded in
1854. Its name was shortened
to Galveston Wharf Co. in 1860.
Commercial wharves had oper-
ated in Galveston since 1854,
and a number of mercantile
and trading firms operated pri-
vate wharves. Led by Menard
and other key investors in the
Galveston City Co., Galveston
Wharf Co. began buying and
consolidating wharves under
common management. By 1859,
10 wharves and their associated
warehouses and terminal facili-
ties had fallen under control of
the wharf company, giving it a
monopoly over the state’s most
important export facilities.
In 1867, the city sued the
wharf company over street
access to the wharves, having
already lost a previous battle
over public versus private 
ownership of the waterfront
itself. The resulting settlement
merged all the docks and rele-
vant waterfront facilities, includ-
ing streets, into the wharf com-
pany. In exchange for tighten-
ing the company’s monopoly
grip, Galveston received undi-
vided one-third ownership of
the docks and a nonvoting
voice on the company’s board
of owners and directors.
In 1869, brothers John and
George Sealy, George Ball and
John H. Hutchings purchased
the one railroad serving Galves-
ton, the Galveston, Houston
and Henderson. All of these
men were major investors in
the Galveston Wharf Co., and
in 1870 they received permis-
sion from the Texas Legislature
to integrate the railroad into
Galveston’s wharves and termi-
nals. The result was once more
to tighten the company’s con-
trol of local export facilities.
The extent of Galveston
Wharf Co.’s misdeeds remains
a matter of historical debate,
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but there is no question that it
earned a statewide reputation
for excessive charges, quaran-
tine fees and a cavalier attitude
toward customers. It was an
irritant to cotton farmers, cotton
3shippers and steamship lines.
The Texas Grange singled out
Galveston Wharf Co. (along
with the Houston and Texas
Central Railway) for special
wrath among those institutions
it saw as systematically robbing
the state’s farmers. At home,
Willard Richardson of the Gal-
veston News was an outspoken
opponent, labeling Galveston
Wharf Co. the “octopus of the
Gulf.”
Controlling the wharves was
critical because Galveston was
the best single outlet for cotton
and other goods for Texas,
Oklahoma and Kansas. After
the Civil War, the cotton trade
resumed its normal pattern,
with Houston and Galveston
serving as the chief outlet. As
the rail network spread north
to the Blackland Prairie and
increased access to agricultural
trade, the importance of Hous-
ton and Galveston multiplied.
It would not be until 1873 that
the Houston and Texas Central
would connect with the Mis-
souri, Kansas and Texas near
the Oklahoma border and open
up markets such as Chicago
and St. Louis for Texas cotton.
Until that time, all trade fun-
neled south throughG alveston,
and Galveston Wharf Co. levied
a toll for virtually every bale,
barrel or crate that left the
state. The Grange, for example,
claimed that while dray charges
to move a bale of cotton from
rail to outbound steamer were
only 15 cents, the wharf com-
pany collected 40 cents per bale
and pocketed the difference.
Competing with Galveston
With Houston increasingly
secure in its control of the rail-
ways, the competition between
Houston and Galveston moved
to the waterways. Galveston
Wharf Co. became a catalyst
for rivalry. The perception of
high and unreasonable charges
provoked efforts to get around
the Galveston docks, and Buf-
falo Bayou seemed to offer an
alternative path to the sea.
Navigation on Buffalo
Bayou had always been impor-
tant to Houston. Buffalo Bayou
Co. was formed in 1839. It col-
lected $200 from local merchants
and contracted to have five
miles of Buffalo Bayou cleared
of dangerous snags and debris.
The first local docks were built
in 1840 upon authorization by
the state legislature. In June
1842, a city ordinance estab-
lished the Port of Houston,
authorizing it to control wharves
and landings along Buffalo
Bayou, collect wharf fees and
invest in navigation improve-
ments. Throughout the Civil
War, only small, shallow-draft
vessels could navigate Buffalo
Bayou.
Meanwhile, Galveston faced
navigation problems of its own.
To say that it was home to the
finest harbor between New
Orleans and Vera Cruz did not
mean it was immune to the
shifting channels and shallow
sandbars of all Gulf ports. The
27-mile-long island parallels
the Texas coast, with the harbor
between the island and the
coast. A sandbar lay across 
the harbor entrance just below
the water’s surface. In 1837,
the sandbar had a depth of 
12 feet, but shoaling had caused
it to grow, and by 1869 the
harbor depth was reduced to
only 8 feet.
The presence of the sand-
bar meant that no sizable ship
could enter the port, particu-
larly the deep-draft sailing
ships of the day. Early innova-
tors in Texas shipping, such as
Charles Morgan, had begun to
use shallow-draft steamships to
minimize the problems posed
by sandbars, but with a clear-
ance of only 8 feet even Mor-
gan’s specially designed ships
had to wait for high tide to
cross the bar. Ships that could
not enter the harbor had to
unload their cargo into shallow-
draft barges or smaller ships to
be carried ashore, a process
called “lightering” that was
common to the Gulf Coast.
In the 1850s, as the wharf
company’s reputation spread
and as cooperation between
Houston and Galveston deteri-
orated, Houston shipping inter-
ests had the simple idea of
bypassing Galveston altogether.
If cargo had to be moved to
smaller vessels anyway, why
not bring the barges or boats
directly up Buffalo Bayou,
where rail connections were
better? Traffic on Buffalo Bayou
in the 1850s was largely monop-
olized by Houston and Galves-
ton Navigation Co., and in the
late 1850s the company began
soliciting shippers to anchor in
the channel outside the harbor
and bring cargo directly to
Houston.
After the Civil War, the eco-
nomic battle between Houston
and Galveston resumed in
earnest. Houston and Galveston
Navigation Co. failed to survive
the war. It was replaced in
1866 by Houston Direct Navi-
gation Co. Privately owned but
actively promoted by Houston
authorities, the new company
was specifically chartered to
promote trade on the bayou 
by avoiding wharf charges at
Galveston. The company pros-
pered. In 1869, it reported carry-
ing 11,544 passengers and
815,466 barrels of freight. By
1872, the company operated
four steamers, 18 barges and
three tugs.
7 Galveston Wharf Co.
retaliated by levying a surcharge
4on any ship that lightered in
the channel to deliver goods 
to Houston and then sought a
return cargo out of Galveston
Harbor.
Infrastructure Improvements
The next stage of the eco-
nomic battle involved infra-
structure improvements. Deep-
ening Galveston’s harbor would
stop Houston’s poaching of
freight in midchannel, and deep-
ening and widening Buffalo
Bayou could offer shippers
deepwater access to the state’s
rail center. Both sides sought
the advantage.
Following the Civil War,
Galveston established a board
of harbor improvements, raised
$15,000 through a bond issue
and adopted a plan to deepen
the channel across the sandbar.
This was done by sinking cedar
pilings below water level, using
the pilings to direct the current
in such a way that it scoured
out the sandbar and deepened
the channel. After several stops
and starts and with help from
the federal government, the
technique returned the bar to its
earlier 12-foot depth by 1873.
In 1869, Houston organized
Buffalo Bayou Ship Channel
Co. to make the ship channel a
reality. Supported partly with
initial public funding and partly
by wharfage and tonnage taxes,
the company sought to create 
a 9-foot-deep channel from
Houston to the Gulf of Mexico.
In 1870, Congress was per-
suaded to make Houston a port
of entry, and the Army Corps of
Engineers conducted a survey
of ship channel possibilities.
The Corps concluded that a 
6-foot-deep, 100-foot-wide
channel was possible but that
improvements above Harrisburg
would be difficult. Both the
ship channel company and the
Corps were making slow pro-
gress when outside events
intervened.
Through its manipulation 
of facilities and rates, Galveston
Wharf Co. had alienated the
dominant shipper in the Gulf
of Mexico by placing his ships
at a competitive disadvantage.
Charles Morgan and his Morgan
Lines turned to Houston to
make a major investment—
building Houston’s first ship
channel at his own expense.
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The wharf company had
apparently angered Morgan
and damaged his business in
several ways. Morgan had
opened Galveston–New Orleans
shipping in 1837 and virtually
monopolized Gulf routes prior
to the Civil War, pioneering the
use of shallow hulls, holding
postal contracts and offering a
high level of service. He was 
a good customer of both Gal-
veston Wharf Co. and Houston
Direct Navigation Co.
Around 1870, the wharf
company sought to reduce its
dependence on trade with New
Orleans and to enhance trade
with New York, specifically with
the Mallory steamship line. 
The owner, Charles H. Mallory,
agreed to build four shallow-
hulled steamers to serve Galves-
ton and to arrange direct and
through rates with the Galves-
ton, Houston and Henderson
Railroad. Ball, Hutchings and
John Sealy agreed to put up
one-fourth of the capital for the
four new Mallory ships.
By late 1870, Morgan’s rela-
tionship with the wharf com-
pany was deteriorating rapidly.
He found his ships subject to
yellow fever quarantines and
sent for long stays at the quar-
antine station in Galveston,
where a heavy tax was levied.
In 1873, Morgan successfully
sued to have the tax removed
but could not stop the arbitrary
quarantines. In 1874, long-term
rebates offered to Morgan by
the wharf company expired
and were not renewed, placing
him at a rate disadvantage rela-
tive to Mallory Lines.
In July 1874, Morgan joined
forces with Houston. He pur-
chased the assets and improve-
ments of both Houston Direct
Navigation Co. and Buffalo
Bayou Ship Channel Co. By
mid-1875, eight dredges were
working around the clock, and
in April 1876, a 9-foot channel
was complete as far as Clinton,
where Morgan established a
terminal. The first ship to dock
at Clinton was a Morgan ship
loaded with railroad construc-
tion supplies, and Morgan
immediately built a seven-mile
spur to connect his Clinton 
terminal to the Houston and
Texas Central Railroad. Morgan
assumed control of the Hous-
ton and Texas Central in 1877;
he had bypassed Galveston
and was again in control of his
own destiny.
Galveston then raised its
sights to clearing a channel 20
or more feet deep. New Orleans
had succeeded in opening a
channel more than 26 feet
deep, the standard of the day
for a first-class port, by build-
ing jetties to concentrate the
current and scour away sand
barriers. The Army Corps of
Engineers undertook similar
projects in Galveston in both
1874 and 1880, aiming to
achieve a 25-foot-deep channel,
but both endeavors failed.
Finally, in 1890, Congress
authorized $6.2 million to do
the job right. The funds were
appropriated to build five miles
of protective granite and sand-
stone jetties and clear a 22-foot
channel. In October 1896, the
British steamer Algoa, the largest
5in the world and drawing 21
feet, docked at Galveston. The
days of lightering in open water
were over for ships with Gal-
veston cargoes.
Meanwhile, Houston had
fallen behind again. Morgan
died in 1878, and Southern
Pacific Co. absorbed most of
his rail and steamship holdings
by 1885. The Clinton terminal
was abandoned in 1880 when a
railroad was finally completed
and opened between Houston
and New Orleans. Barge traffic
continued along Buffalo Bayou,
but under a monopoly toll
levied by Morgan’s heirs, and
the waterway slowly became
less important. In 1892, after
lengthy negotiations, the federal
government bought Morgan’s
improvements to Buffalo Bayou.
Efforts to upgrade the channel
to a 25-foot depth were pro-
moted by Houston, but the
Corps of Engineers, which
argued that recent investments
in the nearby Galveston Harbor
were sufficient for the region,
opposed extensive improve-
ments. Efforts to appeal directly
to Congress were blocked by
the chair of the strategic Harbors
and Rivers Committee.
Railroads Again
In retrospect, the best long-
term strategy for Galveston
might have been to build a net-
work of north–south rail con-
nections, such as that proposed
by the Galveston plan, to facili-
tate rail access to the docks
from the largest region possible.
The connection of the Texas
and Houston Central to the
Missouri, Kansas and Texas in
1873 marked the opening of
Texas markets to the rest of the
United States via rail. Suddenly
Chicago and St. Louis were
Galveston’s competitors, where
there had been none before. It
took most of the remainder of
the decade for Texas railroads to
convert their track to standard
gauge. Among the last to con-
vert—in 1879—was the Hous-
ton, Galveston and Henderson.
Because rates and profits were
higher for short hauls and with
cars interchanged among rail-
roads, Galveston Wharf Co.
resisted the idea of a railcar
rolling from anywhere in the
United States straight onto
Galveston docks.
A second rail line out of
Galveston was finally begun in
1873, but the railroad was bank-
rupt by 1875. George Sealy,
again joining with Hutchings,
Ball and other Galveston in-
vestors, purchased the Gulf,
Colorado and Santa Fe Railway.
By 1881 they had completed a
railroad that bypassed Houston,
passing through Brenham,
Waco and Fort Worth. The pop-
ular version of the motive for
the railroad is that it was built
to get around periodic yellow
fever quarantines imposed by
Houston, which were almost
always put in force at the peak
of cotton-marketing season to
prevent cotton from flowing to
Galveston without stopping in
Houston. In fact, it was recog-
nition—perhaps belated—that
to be successful in a national
rail network, Galveston needed
direct rail access into the Brazos
Valley and the Blackland Prairie
cotton-growing regions.
A significant rail controversy
raged between the two cities
for more than 40 years over the
Houston–Galveston differen-
tial, the difference in the rail
tariff paid for shipping to one
city versus the other. Railroad
companies in the late 19th 
century set the rate for a bale
of cotton shipped to Galveston
as the rate to Houston plus 
7 cents; the 7 cents was the
charge to transfer a bale from
rail to channel steamer in Hous-
ton and ship it to Galveston.
This meant the shipper was
neutral between a Houston and
Galveston market, but Galves-
ton saw it as unfair because 
the 7 cents was well above the
marginal cost of the last 50
miles by rail into Galveston.
Further, in the minds of Galves-
ton supporters was the nagging
issue of how the rate would
benefit Houston if the city
achieved deepwater access.
The Texas Railroad Commission
supported the tariff in 1894,
but complaints, hearings and
court battles dragged on until
1933, when the differential 
was eliminated. The Houston–
Galveston Equalization Agree-
ment finally ended the contro-
versy by equalizing the rates
between the two cities on
export and import items, plus
rates on most coastal traffic.
The Hurricane and After
By 1900, Galveston held a
clear edge in port facilities but
found itself at the terminus of a
poorly developed rail network.
Houston was the regional rail
hub but could not demonstrate
the logic of a second port only
50 miles from Galveston. The
hurricane of 1900, however,
dramatically demonstrated
Galveston’s vulnerability to
storms. With 6,000 dead and
3,600 homes lost, the great
storm of September 1900 still
ranks as the greatest natural
disaster in U.S. history.
Houston Congressman
Thomas H. Ball had proposed
an 18-foot channel for Buffalo
Bayou in 1896, but the Army
Corps of Engineers, which had
just finished its work on the
Galveston jetties, opposed the
legislation and it failed. In 1902,
after the storm, opposition
6evaporated, and Congress allo-
cated $1 million for a ship
channel with a turning basin at
Long Reach, four miles from
downtown. In 1914, the chan-
nel would be dredged to 25
feet, allowing Houston to fully
engage in Gulf trade.
Galveston responded posi-
tively to the storm in a number
of ways. It reopened its wharves
only two weeks after the storm,
built a 17-foot seawall and
raised the island’s elevation to
reduce future flooding. How-
ever, at a time when the rest of
the state was poised to develop
a significant manufacturing
base, Galveston’s reputation for
storms and flooding deterred
investors. In 1900, investment
in Galveston manufacturing
($6.1 million) was not much
different from that of Houston
($7 million), Dallas ($6.9 mil-
lion) and San Antonio ($4.5
million). But Galveston would
never compete successfully
with these cities again.
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Table 1 shows the distribu-
tion of occupations in Galves-
ton and other Texas cities in
1910, a decade after the storm.
The two figures that stand out
for Galveston are its weakness
in manufacturing and its depen-
dence on transportation. More-
over, its strength in transporta-
tion was under attack by this
time, and not just by Houston.
In 1904, nearby Texas City
opened its own deepwater
facilities, and subsequent legis-
lation would allow all Texas
cities to create navigation dis-
tricts, with voter approval, for
the improvement of rivers,
bays, streams and other water-
ways. By 1937, Orange, Beau-
mont, Port Neches, Corpus
Christi, Port Isabel and Browns-
ville all had 25- to 30-foot
channels, compared with 34 feet
at Houston and Galveston.
Galveston’s one-time monopoly
on Gulf shipping was gone.
For Houston, in contrast, 
oil would bring manufacturing,
and the combination of rail-
roads and deep water would
make Houston Texas’ leading
port. Houston would become
the dominant city in the South-
west in the 1930 census and
hold that position for the rest
of the 20th century. Its rival
through the century would be
not Galveston, but Dallas.
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Table 1
Distribution of Occupations in Texas Cities, 1910
Dallas Galveston Houston San Antonio
Agriculture .8 1.3 1.1 2.4
Mining .1 0 .2 .3
Manufacturing 26.8 22.5 27.0 28.1
Transportation 8.3 21.9 12.1 9.6
Trade 21.6 13.3 16.7 18.5
Public service 1.7 2.8 1.6 5.0
Personal service 23.0 22.6 25.7 22.5
Clerical 11.0 10.1 9.6 6.8
SOURCE: Census of Population, 1910.America and improvement in
Europe—picked up a notch.
Oil service and machinery
companies express frustration
over not seeing better drilling
conditions with energy prices
as strong as they have been
recently. Major companies con-
tinue to steer a steady course
in drilling, but independents
seem reluctant to accelerate
exploration activity—their 




the Ship Channel seems to have
taken a page from the rest of
the industrial sector. Demand
slowed significantly over the
summer. It has become difficult
to pass through price increases,
and prices of polyvinyl chloride
and polyethylene actually fell
in recent weeks. High feed-
stock prices have hurt profit
margins.
Back-to-back hurricanes
coming ashore from the Gulf
limited production briefly and
pulled down inventories of
crude and oil products. Com-
bined with very strong demand
for gasoline, refiner profit mar-
gins have improved moderately
in recent weeks. Gasoline de-
mand, strong all year, has failed
to put much upward pressure
on pump prices because of high
levels of imports, especially
from Europe.
homes were up sharply in Sep-
tember compared with last
year. But more important, con-
tacts report sales have been
steady and strong over the last
three months. Low interest
rates continue to work their
magic in keeping sales moving.
Office occupancy rates in
Houston have been falling for
four quarters, especially down-
town. With roughly 1.5 million
square feet coming back onto
the market due to Enron, Arthur
Andersen and the Chevron–
Texaco merger, plus another 
2 million square feet scheduled
to be completed soon, the 
central business district faces
continued hard times. How-
ever, the softness is not limited
to downtown; the Galleria and
Westchase areas have also regis-
tered negative absorption in
recent months.
Energy Prices and Drilling
Crude oil prices have weak-
ened in recent weeks, as OPEC
overproduction and a deflated
war premium pulled the price
of West Texas Intermediate
down to $25 per barrel. Simi-
larly, natural gas prices pulled
back under $4 per thousand
cubic feet as gas inventories
entered the storage season at
record high levels.
Domestic drilling activity
stayed near its 26-week average
of 850 working rigs, and inter-
national drilling—led by stabi-
lization of activity in Latin
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he pattern of no job
growth continues in Houston,
much as it does in the rest of
the state and nation. The period
of flat employment now stretches
back over 18 months. The un-
employment rate was 5.9 per-
cent in September, and it has
held steady near 6 percent since
July. After four months showing
moderate growth, the Houston
Purchasing Managers Index
turned weaker, indicating mod-
erate contraction in September
and October. The latest October
reading is 49, just under the
break-even point of 50.
Retail and Auto Sales
Retailers report that condi-
tions improved in October but
sales are still weak. October-
to-October sales comparisons
are much more favorable than
those of August and September,
although they are not nearly as
strong as retailers would like.
Colder weather seemed to work
in favor of department stores,
and strong home sales are
helping furniture retailers.
Year-over-year auto sales
are difficult to judge because of
the effects last year of Tropical
Storm Allison. However, they
definitely weakened in October.
October sales hit their lowest
level locally since 1997, even
though rebates and incentives
remain in full force.
Real Estate
Home sales are similarly
difficult to judge because both
new and existing home sales
in Houston were hit hard last
year by the September 11
events. Not surprisingly, sales
of both new and existing
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